The Middle East is not one place. It includes some of the world's wealthiest economies and some of its most fragile. So the question "what will AI mean for the region?" has many answers. This page looks at each sub-region in turn. It focuses on people (their services, jobs, languages and safety) rather than on rivalry between states. Where the news is difficult, we report it with sources and without taking sides.

Our approach on this page. We describe events using named sources. We do not assign blame in conflicts, and we avoid predictions. Where we could not verify something to our standard, we say so.

The Gulf states: investment under pressure

The six GCC states are investing heavily in AI, each in its own way. Our GCC AI landscape page covers them in detail. In brief:

  • UAE: national AI strategy to 2031, open models (Falcon, K2 Think, Jais), a K-12 AI curriculum, and very high everyday use of generative AI.
  • Saudi Arabia: a national data and AI strategy (2020), the PIF-owned company HUMAIN, Arabic-first models (ALLaM), and a large virtual-hospital network.
  • Qatar: the Fanar Arabic AI platform (2024) and a $20bn AI-infrastructure partnership between Qai and Brookfield.
  • Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman: government AI policies and programmes, and in Oman's case a new AI Special Zone in Muscat (Royal Decree 50/2026).

What this could mean for neighbours: Gulf data centres can serve users across a wide radius. Arabic-first models can serve more than 400 million Arabic speakers, a figure HUMAIN cites. Gulf universities and employers also draw talent from across the region. These are real opportunities. They also raise a fair question: will the benefits be shared, or concentrated?

The Levant: strategies with limited resources

Jordan has a national Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Plan (2023–2027), led by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship. It sets out 68 projects across 12 sectors (MoDEE; UNIDO; search-verified). Jordan's Arabic-speaking tech workforce and start-up scene give it a natural role in Arabic-language AI. (We will add verified labour-market figures in a later update.)

For Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories, the most pressing questions are more basic: electricity, connectivity, and humanitarian access. We have not yet verified country-specific AI data for these places to our standard, and we will not fill that gap with guesses. The honest point is that AI's benefits depend on basic infrastructure that some communities currently lack.

Egypt and North Africa: scale and talent

Egypt launched the second edition of its National AI Strategy (2025–2030) in January 2025, organised around governance, data, infrastructure, technology, talent and the wider ecosystem (MCIT; Arab News; search-verified). As the most populous Arab country, Egypt matters to the Arabic AI ecosystem as a source of talent and Arabic-language data, and as a large market for Arabic AI services.

In Libya, AI has already been used in a peace-building context. The UN Support Mission in Libya ran AI-assisted digital dialogues in 2020–21 that let up to 1,000 Libyans at a time take part in consultations (ReliefWeb). We describe this in How AI can help prevent conflict.

Iraq, Iran and Yemen: where conflict shapes everything

The 2026 war. A war involving the United States, Israel and Iran began on 28 February 2026. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz soon afterwards. On 17 June 2026 the US and Iran signed an interim agreement, mediated by Pakistan, that was meant to reopen the strait and open talks on a final deal (BBC, 17 Jun 2026). It broke down in July amid renewed attacks, and it expired on 17 August without a final deal (Al Jazeera, 17 Aug 2026). As of late September 2026 no agreement was in force. On 26 September President Trump rejected an Iranian seven-day plan to reopen the strait (Al Jazeera, 26 Sep 2026), and shipping through Hormuz remained heavily restricted (Al Jazeera, 27 Sep 2026). Rest of World reported in March that the Red Sea and Hormuz were effectively closed to commercial shipping at the same time. It also noted that about 17 submarine internet cables run through the Red Sea (Rest of World, 4 Mar 2026). In March 2026, drone strikes hit AWS data centres in the UAE, and a nearby strike damaged a facility in Bahrain (CNBC, 15 Sep 2026).

We report these facts because leaving them out would be misleading. We do not offer commentary on the war's causes or conduct. For people across the region, the human cost comes first. For digital infrastructure, the war has shown that cables, data centres and power supplies are physical things that can be damaged, and that resilience has to be designed in. (See Resilience in 2026.)

Iran's long-term role in regional AI will depend on political developments that we do not try to predict here.

Iraq is a large neighbour of both the Gulf states and Iran. We have not yet verified Iraq-specific AI programmes to our standard. This section will be expanded once we have.

Yemen has endured years of conflict and a severe humanitarian crisis. It is also where the United Nations first used an AI-assisted tool in an active mediation process. In June 2020, the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen held a digital dialogue with more than 500 Yemenis, using technology that allows one person to hold a real-time conversation with up to 1,000 people (OSESGY, Aug 2020). The UN was open about the limits on who could take part. It is a modest example, but a real one.

The Gulf as a convenor. Gulf states have long hosted difficult conversations. Oman, for example, hosted the first round of indirect talks between the US and Iran in Muscat on 12 April 2025 (Reuters; search-verified). AI does not replace this kind of human diplomacy. At most, it can support it with better translation, analysis and inclusion.

The digital divide: the quiet risk

The biggest long-term risk for the wider region may not be dramatic at all. It is simply being left behind.

  • The IEA notes that emerging economies outside China account for about half of the world's internet users but less than 10% of global data-centre capacity (IEA, Apr 2025).
  • Microsoft's usage data shows a gap between the Global North and South in generative-AI use: 28.8% versus 16.2% of working-age people in mid-2026 (Microsoft, 21 Sep 2026).

The Gulf's investments could narrow this gap for Arabic speakers, through Arabic models, regional data centres and training places. Or they could widen it, if the benefits stay within the richest states. That outcome is not fixed. It depends on choices about access, pricing, open models and partnerships.

Where hope is reasonable

  • Language. Arabic has long been under-served by AI. Several Gulf models are Arabic-first, and some are openly published.
  • Talent mobility. Gulf employers and universities already train and hire people from across the region.
  • Humanitarian tools. Early-warning forecasts, translation and digital consultations are already in use (see conflict prevention).
  • Shared principles. Bahrain has adopted the GCC Guiding Manual on the Ethics of AI Use, a sign of emerging regional norms.

What we don't know yet

  • How long the Hormuz and Red Sea disruption will last, and its effect on connectivity and investment.
  • Whether Gulf AI services will be offered affordably to neighbouring countries.
  • Reliable, comparable AI data for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Yemen.

This page will be updated as events develop. Every fact is recorded in the platform's fact base, and every forecast or target is logged in the claims register.